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Abstract
A common finding in social sciences is that member change hinders group functioning and performance. However,
questions remain as to why member change negatively affects group performance and what are some ways to alleviate the
negative effects of member change on performance? To answer these questions we conduct an experiment in which we
investigate the effect of newcomers on a group’s ability to coordinate efficiently. Participants play a coordination game in a
four-person group for the first part of the experiment, and then two members of the group are replaced with new
participants, and the newly formed group plays the game for the second part of the experiment. Our results show that the
arrival of newcomers decreases trust among group members and this decrease in trust negatively affects group
performance. Knowing the performance history of the arriving newcomers mitigates the negative effect of their arrival, but
only when newcomers also know the oldtimers performance history. Surprisingly, in groups that performed poorly prior to
the newcomers’ arrival, the distrust generated by newcomers is mainly between oldtimers about each other rather than
about the newcomers.
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Introduction
The composition of groups is rarely stable [1]. Whether in large
collectives such as social movements [2] or in small collectives such
as work teams [3], it is often the case that member change occurs
where existing group members (or oldtimers) are replaced by new
members (or newcomers) [4,5]. Because of the ubiquity of member
change in organizational settings, a considerable amount of
research has surfaced examining how member change affects
group performance. A common finding in social sciences, such as
organization science, economics, decision sciences, industrial
relations, political science, and anthropology, is that member
change hinders group functioning and performance [6,7,8,9,10].
Of course, other research has found the opposite effect:
newcomers enhance group performance. However, these studies
are different from what we are investigating in that they are
particularly focused on creativity and innovation, whereby new
ideas are provided by new members [4,11]. However, questions
that have received less empirical attention are why member
change negatively affects group performance and what are some
ways to alleviate the negative effects of member change on
performance?
Moreland and Levine [12] suggest one reason why member
change may negatively impact group performance: member
change affects intra-group processes. Dineen and Noe [13]
similarly posit that emergent states, or ‘‘properties of the [group]
that are typically dynamic in nature and vary as a function of team
context, inputs, processes, and outcomes’’ [14] are likely to explain
the effects of member change on group performance (p. 357). Two
emergent states posited and found to shape group performance are
task flexibility and group learning [13,15,16]. For example, team
learning and task flexibility suffer from member change (oper-
ationalized as team turnover), and, in turn, lead to reduced team
functioning on self managing manufacturing teams [16]. In
addition, intra-group trust is a third emergent state posited to
explain the effects of member change on group performance
[17,18]. Trust is an individual’s ‘‘expectations, assumptions or
beliefs about the likelihood that another’s future actions will be
beneficial, favorable or at least not detrimental’’ [19] to them (p.
576). However, despite acknowledgment of the importance of trust
for understanding group and team effectiveness [18], little
empirical research has investigated trust in relation to member
change in groups. Van der Vegt and colleagues [16] did
investigate whether social integration (which includes the element
of trust) mediated member change and performance and found no
effect. However, their survey measures of social integration neither
asked about trust directly nor used complete scales from published
research. Further, this work did not control for whether
newcomers were replacing oldtimers. The current research
complements this previous field work by isolating how the arrival
newcomers (while keeping the size of group constant) affected both
trust among group members and how oldtimers and newcomers
perceived each other.
The one empirical investigation the authors are aware of
germane to the current investigation is found in experimental
economics: Weber’s [20] study of the weakest-link game with
increasing group sizes. In this research, Weber [20] compared
cooperation (or what he termed efficient coordination) rates in a
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12-person group to a group that grew from 2 to 12 over a series of
rounds. Weber [20] also examined whether growing groups could
achieve higher levels of cooperation as a function of whether
newcomers (who were waiting to play) knew the performance
history of the group before entering. The paper reported that
groups that grew from 2 to 12, and that shared its history with
newcomers, achieved an average cooperation level higher than
either the control condition (where the group started and kept the
same 12 individuals for all rounds) or growing groups that did not
share their history with newcomers.
The Weber [20] article shows one way member change can
occur: newcomers may be added to an existing group – making the
group larger. A second way is that newcomers can replace existing
members [4]. The current article focuses on situations in which
newcomers are replacing existing group members. Focusing on
member replacement rather than increases in membership holds
constant group size, thus helping us to avoid misattributing our
findings to changes in member composition when they may
actually be due to changes in group size [21]. We also complement
the Weber [20] article by analyzing the role of trust in predicting
behavioral responses to member change.
The current research investigates how the arrival of newcomers
affects intra-group trust among group members and investigates
how the potential negative effects of newcomers can be mitigated.
Using a coordination (weakest-link) game in an experimental lab
setting, our primary findings show: (1) the arrival of newcomers
decrease trust among group members and this decrease in trust
negatively affects group performance; and (2) knowing the
performance history of the arriving newcomers mitigates the
negative effect of their arrival, but only when newcomers also
know the oldtimers performance history. Surprisingly, (3) in
groups that performed poorly prior to newcomers arriving, the
distrust generated by newcomers is between oldtimers about each
other rather than about the newcomers.
Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
Groups are traditionally formed to achieve goals that could not
be achieved by an individual acting alone [22]. One goal that
groups are often intended to achieve is efficiency in coordinating
resources [23]. Our conceptualization of coordination is in line
with economics and social psychology research which suggest that
groups can coordinate to achieve a variety of performance
outcomes, ranging from completely efficient coordination to
completely inefficient coordination [15,24,25,26]. For instance,
there are many settings – ranging from teams to entire economies
– where individuals trying to coordinate may be ‘‘trapped’’ in an
equilibrium that is inferior to other equilibria, and thus their
coordination is somewhat inefficient [15,25,27]. Work teams, for
example, can ‘‘satisfice’’ and settle for routines that produce
suboptimal outcomes but nevertheless create (some) value for an
organization [28]. However, work teams can also ‘‘maximize’’ and
create routines that produce optimal outcomes, thus leading to
more efficient coordination, or totally fail, leading to completely
inefficient coordination. Thus, following the work of experimental
economics and social psychology, we view coordination as a
performance outcome of groups that ranges from completely
efficient coordination to completely inefficient coordination
[15,20,25,26].
One factor that may influence a group’s ability to coordinate
efficiently is trust. As suggested by Camerer and Knez [29] and
Schnake [30], coordination in any organized setting requires trust
because the individuals incur the risk of being made a ‘‘sucker’’ by
those either undependable or unmotivated to contribute their
necessary resources toward achieving the collective’s goal. Thus
for coordination to occur ‘‘harmoniously’’, trust must be present
among group members [23]. The uni-dimensional psychological
approach to trust formation [31] maintains that when groups
form, social uncertainty is high and trust among group members
begins low (at a conceptual level of zero). Social uncertainty (or
strategic risk) is a lack of information about another’s behavioral
intentions, values, and abilities [32,33]. Over time and through
repeated interaction, familiarity increases and routines become
established among group members [34]. Thus, as individuals
interact they are able to evaluate whether group members meet
their expectations; whether their values are congruent; and their
abilities are compatible [35]. As a consequence, social uncertainty
decreases and trust increases [36]. As suggested by McCarter et al.
[37], group member interaction can build trust in two ways. First,
interaction may occur by verbal communication among group
members, where intentions are signaled through spoken word
[38]. The second type of interaction is behavioral: group members
signal their intentions through action, rather than through cheap
talk [39]. Because cheap-talk communication does not guarantee
efficient coordination in groups [25], the current research
examines trust formation through behavioral signaling.
Increased trust is beneficial for the ability of groups to
coordinate efficiently because it reduces the perceived strategic
risk associated with any individuals’ contributions to the group. By
definition, as trust increases, individuals have positive expectations
of the intentions or behavior of others in the group (e.g., their
contributions of resources to a collective goal), and they are willing
to accept vulnerability based upon this expectation. Thus, when a
group of individuals trust one another, and thus have positive
expectations about others in the group it is easier for individuals in
a group to coordinate effectively because they do not anticipate
being made a ‘‘sucker’’ by others and their choices should reflect
this.
Whereas time and repeated interaction decrease social uncer-
tainty and increase trust, member change and the presence of
newcomers increases social uncertainty within a group [40], and
decreases the level of trust among group members [41]. Member
change occurs in two forms. First, newcomers may be added to an
existing group – making the group larger [20]; and second,
newcomers can replace existing members [4]. We focus on
situations in which newcomers are replacing existing group
members. This boundary condition accomplishes two things.
Focusing on member replacement rather than increases in
membership holds constant group size, thus helping to avoid
misattributing our findings to changes in member composition
when they may actually be due to changes in group size [21]. In
addition, focusing on member replacement removes an additional
explanation for changes in group performance: the potential
shrinking of shared benefits occurring when groups grow; i.e.,
when groups grow, the reward must be divided among more
people [9].
When newcomers arrive, existing group members are likely to
experience reduced positive expectations about the intentions or
behavior of others and be less willing to accept vulnerability based
upon these expectations. Existing members may be unsure
whether newcomers will understand and follow established
routines or share the same values and expectations [13,42]. In
turn, the group’s ability to coordinate should be hindered because
effective coordination relies on trust in others [23]. Thus, we posit
the following.
Hypothesis 1: Group members who experience the arrival of
newcomers will engage in less efficient coordination compared to
group members who do not experience the arrival of newcomers.
The Effect of Newcomers on Coordination
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Hypothesis 2: Group members who experience the arrival of
newcomers will trust their fellow group members less compared to
group members who do not experience the arrival of newcomers.
Hypothesis 3: Trust will mediate the negative relationship
between the presence of newcomers and a group’s ability to
coordinate more efficiently.
One way that newcomer effects may be mitigated is by the
oldtimers and newcomers having information about how each
have performed previously in similar situations. Often newcomers
enter groups with reputations known by the oldtimers and vice-
versa [12]. One kind of reputation both oldtimers and newcomers
may know is about each other’s previous performance on similar
tasks. Kollock [43] suggests that performance history may be used
as a signaling mechanism to facilitate efficient coordination in
collective action dilemmas, and it decreases the costs of
coordination among group members [44,45]. Coordinative ability
may improve from information because social uncertainty is
reduced and trust is increased: the group members (new and old)
know how the others behaved in the past and can therefore make
more informed decisions about what behavior is necessary to
achieve efficient coordination in the future.
Hypothesis 4: As the amount of information known by the
group members about each other’s previous performance increas-
es, coordination increases – such that groups that receive full
information achieve more efficient coordination compared to
when no information is provided; groups that receive full
information achieve more efficient coordination compared to
when partial information is provided, and groups that receive
partial information achieve more efficient coordination compared
to when no information is provided.
Methods
Ethics Statement
This study and its consent procedure were approved by the
Chapman University’s Institutional Review Board. Participants
provided written, informed consent to participate.
The Weakest-Link Coordination Game
We test these hypotheses in a laboratory. Laboratory experi-
ments allow for strong internal validity and high psychological realism
while also enabling us to isolate the impact member change has on
trust and subsequent behavior [46,47]. We employ a weakest-link
coordination game [48], in which efficient coordination is attained
when all individuals in the group choose the option that maximizes
group value, but individuals are exposed to private risk by
attempting group coordination when others choose not to
coordinate. Specifically, in the general form of a weakest-link
game there are n participants, and each participant i chooses an
integer ei between 1 and e¯. The payoff of participant i depends on ei
and the minimum integer chosen within the group Min (ei, e2i),
i.e., pi (ei, e2i) = a Min (ei, e2i)2b|ei 2Min (ei, e2i)|+c, where b|ei 2
Min (ei, e2i)| denotes the deviation cost and a, b and c are
constants. Table 1 shows the weakest-link game used in the current
study (n=4, e¯ =7, a = 0.5, b = 0.5 and c = 3). Participants in a 4-
person group could choose any integer ei between 1 and 7. From
Table 1 we see that the set of outcomes where no one has an
incentive to change their selected integer (or equilibria) is located
along the diagonal. The Pareto-optimal (or best) equilibrium,
however, that provides the highest payoffs to all participants,
occurs when each participant chooses the highest integer, e¯ (the
integer 7 in our studies).
There are several benefits gained from using a weakest-link
game. First, because free-riding is impossible, ‘‘cooperation [in the
weakest-link game] … rests on trust’’ [49](p. 2), the game’s design
isolates our primary mediating variable, trust [50]. Second,
weakest-link games model many group tasks common in
organizational settings. Consider three examples. A customer’s
satisfaction with a hotel is often a function of the lowest quality of
service received during their stay. Therefore how the ‘‘weakest’’
staff member serves the customer determines the overall perfor-
mance of the group [29]. Air traffic control is another example:
airplanes cannot take off until luggage is stored, passengers are
seated, permission to take off is granted, and the plane is fueled
[51,52]. Supply chain alliances, who reduce their partner base to
make each partner non-redundant [53], face a weakest-link game
when launching new initiatives since each partner must provide a
necessary component of the project or product [54]. Therefore,
how the ‘‘weakest’’ employee or partner performs determines the
overall performance of the airline or alliance.
Experimental Design
One hundred and ninety-two students enrolled at a small,
private university in the Western United States participated in
exchange for a $7 show-up fee and an opportunity to receive
additional money based on their decisions during the task. This
sample was 40% male, with an average age of 20 years old, and
16% were graduate students. The current study used a one-way
between-subjects design with 48 participants in each of the four
conditions: a control condition and three newcomer conditions. In
the control no-newcomer condition no newcomers were intro-
duced during the task. The three newcomer conditions were as
follows: newcomer/no-information condition (newcomers were
placed within existing groups), newcomer/partial-information
condition (oldtimers were aware of the newcomers’ previous
performance), and newcomer/full-information condition (old-
timers and newcomers were aware of each other’s previous
performance).
Procedure, Task, and Conditions
Participants arrived to the laboratory in groups of 24, were
forbidden to communicate, and were seated at individual
computer terminals. All participants were provided with written
instructions to the weakest-link game (available in Appendix S1)
and were asked to follow along as the experimenter read the
instructions out loud. These instructions highlighted that each
person would be randomly assigned to a four-person group and
play 10 periods in the weakest-link game and that their final
earnings were a function of their group’s choices during the game.
After the instructions were presented, participants could ask
questions. We also conducted a short quiz to verify understanding
of the instructions and the game.
The computerized experimental sessions used the software
program z-Tree [55] to record participant decisions. Each session
proceeded in two parts. In the first part, 24 participants were
randomly assigned to a four-person group to play 10 periods of the
weakest-link game. Participants stayed in the same group
throughout all 10 periods. Although, participants knew the end
period in the first part, they did not know about the second part of
the experiment. This was necessary so that we could compare the
pattern of group performance in the first 10 periods to those in
previous research using weakest-link games.
At the beginning of each period, and based on a matrix
provided (see Table 1), all participants were asked to enter their
choice between 1 and 7. The value chosen by the participant and
the minimum value chosen by all members in the group (including
the participant) determined the payoff in any one period.
Participants did not know the other participants’ choices before
The Effect of Newcomers on Coordination
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making their selection. The Pareto-optimal (or best) equilibrium
that provides the highest payoffs to all participants occurs when
each participant chooses the highest integer (the integer 7 in our
studies). Thus, the greater the number chosen the greater the
attempt of the individual to achieve group efficiency. After all
participants made their decisions, the output screen displayed the
minimum value between 1 through 7 chosen by group members,
as well as the participant’s own payoff. Participants recorded their
results in a hardcopy record sheet, and then moved on to the next
period.
In the experiment’s second part, participants played the
weakest-link game for another 10 periods. However, before the
last 10 periods were played, one of four conditions occurred in the
experimental session. Participants in the control condition were
informed that they would play another 10 periods with the same
group members. Participants in the newcomer conditions were
informed that two members of their group would be randomly
chosen by the computer and exchanged for two new participants
from a different group. Thus, this new group was composed of two
oldtimers (two members for the previous group) and two
newcomers. Note that the current research design is such that
when member change occurred, each group member perceived
themselves and their remaining partner as oldtimers and the two
new group members as newcomers. This group remained fixed for
all 10 periods of the second part of the experiment. As explained to
the participants, these two newcomers both came from the same
group.
In the newcomer/no-information condition, oldtimers knew
nothing of the newcomers’ previous performance and vice versa.
In the newcomer/partial-information and newcomer/full-infor-
mation conditions, participants received partial or full information
about the performance of other participants, respectively. In
particular, in the newcomer/partial-information condition, the
computer randomly selected and informed two out of four group
members (two newcomers or two oldtimers) about how the other
two members performed in the first part of the experiment. The
information displayed on the computer screen was about both
participants’ choices in their group and the minimum group
choice in each period. For example, a participant would see on the
computer screen four columns: column one would be the periods
listed from 1 through 10; column two provided what Player A (a
newcomer) chose in each period; column three provided what
Player B (the other newcomer from the same group as Player A)
chose in each period; and column four showed the minimum value
chosen by that group in each period. In the newcomer/full-
information condition, the computer informed both the newcom-
ers about the performance of oldtimers and oldtimers about the
performance of newcomers. In other words, everyone had
information about the prior performance of other group members
before they began the second part of the experiment.
It should be noted that our design makes newcomers and
oldtimers distinguishable to participants; participants can differ-
entiate who is new in their group and who is not. From the
participant’s perspective, the instructions inform them that they
will be joined by two new group members: each participant is thus
an oldtimer from their perspective. This design allows us to control
for the amount of experience each participant had in their group –
i.e., everyone experiences 10 periods of game play before member
change occurred – thereby preventing our findings from being
credited to changes in ‘‘role experience’’ among group members
rather than member change [8].
After learning their group’s performance in period 10, but
before the beginning of the experiment’s second part, all
participants completed a survey questionnaire assessing their trust
level towards other participants. Participants also completed a
demographic questionnaire at the end of the second part of the
experiment. After completing the entire experiment, participants
received a total earnings sheet and the experimenter selected one
period for payment from both the first and second parts of the
experiment by rolling a 10-sided die twice in front of the group.
Participants earned $18 on average, and sessions lasted approx-
imately 45–50 minutes.
Measures
The primary dependent measures in the current study include a
behavioral measure of coordination choice and a survey measure for
trust. Coordination choice is assessed at the individual level and
measured on a scale from 1 to 7 [48]. Participants selected their
decision (1–7) in each of the following periods: periods 1–9 and
periods 11–19. Periods 10 and 20 were excluded in our analysis to
avoid ‘‘endgame effects’’ [56] and to remain consistent with
previous research using weakest-link games [20]; however their
inclusion did not affect the significance of our hypothesis testing.
Recall that the Pareto-optimal (or best) equilibrium that provides
the highest payoffs to all participants occurs when each participant
chooses the highest integer (the integer 7 in our studies). Thus, the
greater the number chosen the greater the attempt of the
individual to achieve group efficiency. We also assess how much
an individual trusts that all of their fellow group members would
select the value 7 (the highest coordination choice) in every period
of the upcoming 10 periods. The trust scale is an index composed
of 6-items adapted from Robinson [19] and showed high reliability
(a=0.91).
Table 1. Payoffs in the Weakest-Link Coordination Game.
Your Choice Minimum Value of X Chosen
7 6 5 4 3 2 1
7 $6.50 $5.50 $4.50 $3.50 $2.50 $1.50 $0.50
6 $6.00 $5.00 $4.00 $3.00 $2.00 $1.00
5 $5.50 $4.50 $3.50 $2.50 $1.50
4 $5.00 $4.00 $3.00 $2.00
3 $4.50 $3.50 $2.50
2 $4.00 $3.00
1 $3.50
The Effect of Newcomers on Coordination
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To further probe how trust in group members was affected by
newcomers, several additional measures were included in the
survey at the beginning of the second part of the experiment.
Participants were asked to make non-incentivized behavioral
predictions of what they believed each member of their group (i.e.,
Person A, Person B, and Person C) would select in the upcoming
period. In the newcomer condition, participants were informed
that Person A and B were the new group members and Person C
was the remaining group member. All survey items are provided in
Appendix S2.
Three variables were used as controls for the current study.
First, considering that gender has been found to affect interde-
pendent decision making in mixed-motive tasks, we recorded and
coded a participant’s gender as 1 =male and 0= female [57].
Second, because previous research has found that those with
educational backgrounds in economics/business behave differently
than other majors in mixed-motive settings [58], we coded each
participant’s majors as 1= economics/business major, 0 = other-
wise. Lastly, we controlled for an individual’s group performance
history as the average of group’s minimum chosen value across the
periods in the previous game. This last control was necessary
considering that behavioral norms often emerge through repeated
interactions with interdependent others and these behaviors can
‘‘spillover’’ into future tasks [15,59]. In addition, this control was
necessary considering that the effect of newcomers on oldtimer’s
perceptions and behavior can change as a function of how the
oldtimers performed prior to newcomer arrivals [60]. All data
from the current experiment are available upon request.
Results
In testing our hypotheses and conducting post hoc analysis we
use variations of ANOVA and panel regressions. When conduct-
ing various ANOVA analysis we mainly used the average across
Periods 1–10 (or Periods 11–20) per subject as one independent
observation. This is a standard practice in management and
organization sciences. When appropriate, we also examined the
robustness of our results using one group as one independent
observation. Finally, we report the estimation results of random
effect regressions, controlling for subject effects.
Figure 1 provides the mean coordination choice values (for periods
11–19) and trust levels for participants across all conditions.
Gender and educational background did not have any significant
effect on the outcome variables and are excluded from further
analysis. A MANOVA, with group performance history as the
independent variable and mean coordination choice across
periods 11–19, trust, and predicted future behavior as dependent
variables, found that group performance history was a positive predictor
of coordination choice, trust, and predicted future behavior of
oldtimers; all Fs (1, 189) .6.87, all ps ,0.01. However, the
inclusion of group performance history did not affect the relationships
among our constructs in our hypothesis testing: the presence of
newcomers impacted a participant’s behavior and perceptions of
others’ trustworthiness independent of their group performance
history. Also, an ANOVA, with mean coordination choice as the
dependent variable and condition as the independent variable,
found that a participant’s mean coordination choice did not
change as a function of condition in periods 1–9; F (3, 188) = 0.33,
p=0.80. This null finding is expected since the newcomer
condition occurred after the end of period 10. Unless otherwise
specified, all statistics provided in our analysis were reported using
one-tailed tests and exclude all control variables; however, even
with their inclusion, our effects remained significant at the 5-
percent level.
Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis 1 posits that group members experiencing the
presence of newcomers coordinate less efficiently compared to
those in groups that do not experience the presence of newcomers.
We test this hypothesis in two ways. First, we compare the mean
coordination choice between the no-newcomer condition and the
newcomer/no-information condition. In support of Hypothesis 1,
an ANOVA, with mean coordination choice as the dependent
variable and condition as the dependent variable, shows that
individuals choose less efficient coordination values in groups with
newcomers (M=5.86, S.D. = 1.55) compared to those groups
without newcomers (M=6.85, S.D. = 0.27); F (1, 94) = 18.88,
p,0.001, g2 = 0.17. Second, we employ a panel regression with
subject specific random effects, where coordination choice in periods
11 through 19 is the dependent variable and the independent
variables are group performance history (i.e., group coordination
in periods 1 through 10) and a treatment dummy variable
(1 = newcomer/no-information and 0= no-newcomer). The esti-
mation of the panel regression shows that, even when controlling
for the history of play, a treatment variable is negative and
significant; b=21.41, Z=24.91, p,0.01.
Hypothesis 2 posits that group members experiencing the
presence of newcomers would trust their fellow group members
less compared to when no newcomers were present. In support of
Hypothesis 2, an ANOVA, with trust as the dependent variable
and condition as the independent variable, shows that trust is lower
for individuals in the newcomer/no-information condition
(M=3.37, S.D. = 1.23) compared to those in the no-newcomer
condition (M=3.95, S.D. = 1.37); F (1, 94) = 4.73, p,0.05,
g2 = 0.05.
Hypothesis 3 posits that trust would mediate the negative
relationship between the presence of newcomers and coordination
in a group. We test for mediation following necessary steps
outlined by Kenny, Kashy, and Bolger [61]. In step 1, a regression
found a significant negative effect of the presence of newcomers on
trust; b=20.58, S.E. = 0.27, p,0.05. In step 2, a regression found
a significant positive correlation between coordination and trust;
b=0.26, S.E. = 0.09, p,0.01. Finally, in step 3, a Sobel test found
complete mediation of newcomers and coordination by trust;
Z=21.74, p,0.05. Therefore, there is support for Hypothesis 3.
Lastly, Hypothesis 4 posits that increasing the information
known by the group members about each other’s previous
performance would increase coordination. We test this hypothesis
in two ways. First, we employ a panel regression with subject
specific random effects, where coordination choice in periods 11
Figure 1. Mean Coordination Choice (in Periods 11–19) and
Trust by Condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055058.g001
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through 19 is the dependent variable and three ordinal newcomer
conditions (1 = no information, 2= partial information, and
3= full information) is the explanatory variable. The estimation
of the panel regression shows a positive linear relationship in the
predicted direction; b= 0.46, Z=2.66, p,0.01. Next, we examine
whether each additional set of information significantly improves
coordination. We follow the procedure outlined by Winer [62] by
comparing coordination choice in the newcomer/no-information
condition (as a pseudo-control condition) to newcomer/partial-
information and newcomer/full-information conditions (p. 89). A
Dunnett t-test (k=3, n=48) finds a significant difference in mean
coordination choice between the newcomer/full-information
(M=6.38) and the newcomer/no-information condition
(M=5.86); tD (141) = 21.85, p,0.05; but no significant difference
in mean coordination choice between newcomer/full-information
(M=6.38) and newcomer/partial-information conditions
(M=6.13); tD (141)= 20.89, p=0.19. Additional analysis finds
that there is also no difference in mean coordination choice between
the newcomer/no-information and newcomer/partial-information
conditions. Therefore, there is partial support for Hypothesis 4:
full information negates the negative effect of newcomers on
coordination, while partial information does not.
Alternative Explanations of Primary Results
In considering previous empirical work [16], task flexibility and
group learning are potential alternative explanations for our
findings. Group tasks are considered flexible when group members
may ‘‘fill in’’ for each other in the group to maintain high
performance [63]. The weakest-link game structure leaves no
room for a participant to replace the choices of other group
members: everyone must choose 7 for the group to perform at the
highest efficiency. The inflexibility of the weakest-link game, which
is constant in both conditions, removes task flexibility as an
alternative explanation.
To consider the group-learning explanation, Van der Vegt and
colleagues [16] conclude that ‘‘any amount of [member change]
may create an uncertain interpersonal environment in which team
members are uncomfortable taking the risks necessary to engage in
learning behaviors’’ to improve group performance (p. 1186).
While we cannot assess group learning directly, we can examine
whether risk-taking explains our findings. We did so by examining
the proportion of individuals selecting a coordination value above
the minimum value chosen in their group (thus indicating high
risk-taking) [51], and whether such risk-taking occurred among a
lower proportion of individuals in the newcomer condition
compared to the control condition (p. 104). In isolating periods
12 through 19, we coded an individual’s coordination-value choice
in each period as a 1 if it was above the group’s minimum choice
in the previous period and 0 otherwise. Across periods, all cases
where the group’s minimum value was 7 were excluded from the
analysis because participants could in no way take a risk so as to
improve group performance. The final ratios of risk-taking
behavior to all actions taken in the no-newcomer condition and
no-information, newcomer condition were 45/88 and 105/188,
respectively. Using generalized estimating equations with period as
the within-subject factor [64], no significant difference in risk-
taking between no-newcomer condition (M=48.9%) and new-
comer/no-information condition (M=55.9%) was found;
b=0.28, x2 (1) = 1.17, p.0.20.
Post Hoc Analysis: Trust of Newcomers and Oldtimers
While our primary findings support our hypothesis that trust
mediates the relationship between newcomers and group perfor-
mance, a remaining question is who in the group was not being trusted
when newcomers arrived? In other words, which subgroup – oldtimers
and/or newcomers – is driving distrustful behavior? To address
this question, we first observe that an individual’s behavioral
predictions for newcomers and oldtimers are significantly correlated
with their subsequent coordination choice in period 11; both rs .0.40,
both ps,0.001. This finding, combined with our finding that Trust
mediates the relationship between newcomers and coordination choice
(Hypothesis 3), leads us to assume that these behavioral predictions
are representations of trust. We next compare an individual’s
behavioral prediction for the oldtimer’s behavior to a newcomer’s
behavior in the newcomer/no-information condition as a function
of the group’s performance history in periods 1–9. We coded a
group as high performing if that group’s average integer selected
across the first nine periods was 7, and as low performing
otherwise. The results are displayed in Figure 2. A repeated-
measure ANOVA, with subgroup (1 = oldtimer and 0= newcomer)
as a within-subject factor and group performance history as a between-
subject factor finds that participants believed the newcomers
would choose a higher value in period 11 (M=5.86, S.D. = 1.50)
compared to the oldtimer (M=4.81, S.D. = 1.90); F(1, 45) = 11.96,
p,0.01, g2 = 0.21, and this main effect is qualified by a significant
interaction: only when group performance is low do participants
predict that newcomers will coordinate more efficiently than
oldtimers; F(1, 45) = 4.94, p,0.05, g2 = 0.10. Considering there
was no way for participants to delineate between the two
newcomers (Person A and Person B), we averaged these best
guesses and compared this average to the best guess for Person C
(the oldtimer). A Pearson correlation supported this decision for
averaging: the correlation of best guesses of value choice between
Person A and Person B was r=0.93, p,0.001.
The group identity literature on the ‘‘black-sheep effect’’ may
explain this negativity toward oldtimers [65]. The black-sheep
effect occurs when group members react to non-cooperative (or
poor performing) in-group members more negatively than those
not part of the group [66]. Two common reactions to black sheep
are greater distrust and subsequent defensive behavior against the
black sheep in future interactions [67]. In relation to our findings,
an oldtimer of a group experiencing poor coordination during
periods 1–9 may view the remaining oldtimer more negatively
(and distrust them more) compared to incoming newcomers; but
this is only the case where Group Performance History is poor.
Figure 2. Behavioral Prediction Based on Group Performance
History in the Newcomer/No-Information Condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0055058.g002
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Discussion and Conclusion
In summary, our results support our hypotheses. Newcomers
negatively affect a group’s ability to coordinate efficiently because
trust declines among the group members. However, this finding is
qualified by additional analysis that suggests oldtimers trust each
other less compared to the newcomers when group performance
history is poor. This finding is consistent with the black-sheep
effect from the social psychology literature. We also find that
information about group members’ previous performance miti-
gates the negative effect that newcomers have on coordination.
However, whereas full information bridged the gap caused by
newcomers, partial information did not. Trust mediates the
relationship between the provision of information about group
members and the coordination patterns observed, such that
greater coordination is found in groups with greater information
because such information increases levels of trust in the group.
Our investigation of how and why newcomers affect group
performance contributes to our understanding of group dynamics in
several ways. First, previous work on group member change has
encouraged scholars to investigate how group emergent states
mediate newcomer effects on group performance [13]. Some work
has surfaced recently to address this question. Specifically, research
on self-managing manufacturing teams has found that team
turnover (i.e., the number of individuals leaving the team divided
by group size) negatively impacts team performance through the
emergent states of reduced team learning and task flexibility [16].
Our laboratory research complements this field research by
identifying group trust as an additional emergent state that explains
the negative effect of member change on group performance:
newcomers reduce levels of trust in groups, and, in turn, trust
negatively affects how efficiently the group coordinates. Thus,
whereas previous research has identified how the developed in-
group processes of a group (e.g., flexibility) mediate the newcomer-
performance relationship [16], the current paper highlights how the
quality of interpersonal relationships (e.g., trust) also explains the
member change-group performance relationship.
In addition to showing that trust mediates the relationship
between member change and group performance, our supple-
mental findings suggest that oldtimers’ trust levels for one another
are actually most directly affected when newcomers enter groups.
Specifically, as would be predicted by the ‘‘black-sheep effect,’’
newcomers create distrust in poor performing groups, but this
distrust is about how oldtimers expect each other to behave, rather
than about how the newcomers will behave [65]. This finding
begins to address the call to understand how trust and behavior
among oldtimers change when newcomers arrive [12] and suggests
that managers and leaders of collective action need not only worry
about how oldtimers perceive the newcomers but how the
oldtimers perceive each other – especially when the group is
performing poorly prior to newcomers arriving. Indeed, most of
the applied research on organizational change and development
focuses on how managers may help newcomers respond and adapt
effectively to existing groups [68]. Whereas socializing newcomers
to new work environments is necessary to improve their transition,
our research suggests that existing norms and relationships among
oldtimers are not immune to change. Specifically, managers
should not just help socialize newcomers to oldtimers, but
oldtimers to oldtimers when member change happens.
A third implication of the current research is with respect to
navigating the negative effects of newcomers on group perfor-
mance. Our study finds that information is critical in mitigating
the negative effects of newcomers; however, only when informa-
tion is known by both oldtimers and newcomers. This finding of
information as a mechanism for alleviating social uncertainty also
has implication for collective action research. For over a decade,
scholarship has asked how individuals may signal intent and
commitment to cooperate with others without traditional mech-
anisms such as group discussion and promise making [43]. Our
research suggests that information about prior performance may
be a useful signal of intent and commitment to cooperate. Filling
this gap has both managerial and theoretical importance
considering that some collective efforts are structured in ways
that prevent group discussion – such as situations where group
members are geographically distributed (e.g., virtual teams) or
newcomers and oldtimers speak different languages. For example,
in the forests of New Brunswick in the late 1800s, several Native
American tribes, who had cooperatively maintained the moose
and caribou population for centuries by conservative hunting,
abruptly ceased cooperating and annihilated these invaluable food
sources. These tribes’ deliberate actions occurred soon after the
arrival of white, French settlers to the region [10]. It is possible
that information about prior performance and intent shared
between the oldtimers and the newcomers may have mitigated this
effect. Indeed, the current paper shows how the ‘‘shadow of the
past’’ (i.e., information about past performance) can be a signal of
both intent and experience [44]; however, this finding is qualified
by the observation that only when everyone shares information do
the negative effects of newcomers decrease.
The findings in the current paper raise several new directions
for future examination. First, our experiments used a game that
requires everyone to cooperate to achieve the best collective
outcome. Some collective action problems are not so strict, but
rather allow group members to cover for each other when one
member does not do what is best for the group [69]. For instance,
before launching a generic advertising campaign, some industries
only need a portion of the total population to chip in [70]. Free
riding is possible but so is the ability to make up for free riders.
Future research may examine how thresholds associated with
achieving collective action interact with the negative effect of
newcomers on coordination. It may be that the negative effect of
newcomers decreases as the ability to cover for other’s mistakes
increases. This may be because social uncertainty and trust are no
longer of great concern since everyone is not needed to pull
through. In addition, newcomers may be welcomed by oldtimers
in some cases compared to others depending on whether the value
of collective action is certain to be worth the effort [71]. For
instance, should they be uncertain that collective action will
produce benefits that will surpass the cost, oldtimers may
strategically welcome newcomers into the fold in hope to use
these newcomers’ resources before expending their own.
A second avenue for future research is in regard to group size.
Our study used four-person groups, compared to many collective
actions that involve dozens or hundreds of individuals. While we
know that large groups can achieve collective action when allowed
to grow gradually over time [20], future research may ask how
group size interplays with the presence of newcomers. Indeed,
simulation research has found that one newcomer (or a few) has
little effect on cooperative routines among very large groups [72].
It may be that, as the proportion of oldtimers to newcomers
decreases, the negative effects of newcomers increases.
Lastly, the negative, linear coordination trends found in all three
newcomer conditions leave a question: what mechanisms alter the
negative direction of the group coordination caused by newcom-
ers? Communication may be one mechanism. Relationship repair
research reminds us that the purpose of the communication (e.g.,
communicating intent, apologies, and making penance) is just as
critical as allowing communication [73]. Considering that
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individuals often require additional penance when promises are
broken [74,75], future research may investigate whether newcom-
ers and oldtimers require different means of amends depending on
who is communicating with whom.
Jesus is recorded to have said that ‘‘… no man putteth new wine
into old bottles; else the new wine will burst the bottles, and be
spilled, and the bottles shall perish’’ (Luke 5:37, KJV). In line with
the above saying, we found that newcomers burst the group’s
ability to coordinate efficiently – apparently because the oldtimers
lost trust in one another when newcomers were present – resulting
in spilled potential value. However, information can be a signaling
mechanism reducing the negative shock of newcomers on groups.
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